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Abstract 
In this paper the problem of inconsistent dynamic choice is discussed, as considered in the literature, both under certainty in the 
context of changing preferences, and under risk and uncertainty in the case of preference orderings which violate expected utility 
theory. 
The problem of inconsistent choice in a dynamic decision situation has been initially analysed in the literature in a context of 
certainty and related to the problem of preferences changing exogenously through time. Hammond (1976, 1977) generalises the 
analysis, but keeps it confined to a situation without risk or uncertainty, which he will introduce only later (Hammond 1988a,b; 
1989). Hammond overcomes the distinction between exogenously and endogenously changing tastes, and concentrates the analysis 
on the essential aspect of the problem - that preferences get reversed over time. This implies considering dynamic choice in a general 
framework. The discussion on dynamic inconsistency under certainty brings about the definition of two different models of 
behaviour: the myopic approach and the sophisticated approach. 
In a context of choice under risk and uncertainty, dynamic inconsistency occurs when preference orderings over risky or uncertain 
outcomes violate Expected Utility Theory, particularly through violation of the Independence Axiom. 
The problem of the dynamic inconsistency of non-expected utility agents is illustrated first through the arguments by Raiffa (1968). 
Raiffa frames the problem of inconsistent choice in a context of dynamic choice under risk, by showing that dynamic consistency is 
not compatible with the usual choices in an Allais paradox when this is considered as a decision problem in two stages. The two main 
models - Machina (1989) and McClennen (1990) - are then discussed, after having illustrated briefly the general theoretical debate on 
the justification of expected utility as a normative theory, in which the dynamic inconsistency argument and the two models are 
framed. Both arguments offer a similar - though formally different - solution to the problem of the dynamic inconsistency in this 
context, the resolute approach. Particular attention is given to McClennen’s (1990) approach to the problem. 
From the discussion it emerges that McClennen has given a formal and very complete model for sophisticated behaviour under risk 
and uncertainty. Other two approaches to this model of behaviour are discussed. Karni and Safra (1989b, 1990) elaborate a model of 
‘behavioural consistency’ which represents a solution to the problem of dynamic inconsistency with non-expected utility preferences, 
extending to risk and uncertainty the sophisticated approach. Dardanoni (1990) frames the problem and discusses the limits of 
sophisticated choice in this context. 
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1. Dynamic inconsistency with changing preferences. Myopic and 
Sophisticated choice. 
The problem of inconsistent choice through time is introduced by Strotz (1956) for the case of 
a consumer who has to choose a plan of consumption for a future period in time so to maximise the 
utility of the plan evaluated at the present moment. Inconsistent behaviour occurs in this 
framework, when the individual does not follow the optimal plan originally selected, “even though 
his original expectations of future desires and means of consumption are verified” (p.165). The 
framework is one of certainty, and tastes are assumed to change exogenously, as they depend on 
time. Strotz’s work has been followed on the same line by Pollak (1968), Phelps and Pollak (1968), 
Blackorby, Nissen, Primont and Russell (1973), Peleg and Yaari (1973). 
Two different strategies of choice are discussed by Strotz in the framework of dynamically 
inconsistent situations: 
• “myopic” or “naive” choice; 
• “consistent planning”, later termed by Hammond (1976) “sophisticated” choice. 
Myopic choice originates from the individual’s inability to recognise that the optimal plan of 
future behaviour formulated at a given point in time is inconsistent with his actual optimising future 
behaviour, so that the individual will act inconsistently with respect to his plans. Alternatively, the 
agent can recognise the conflict, and adopt a “strategy of consistent planning”, rejecting all plans 
that he anticipates he will not follow, and adopting the best plan among those that he knows he will 
follow. 
 
Hammond (1976, 1977) generalises Strotz’s analysis beyond consumer theory, but keeps it 
confined to a situation without risk or uncertainty, which will be introduced only later (Hammond 
1988a,b; 1989). The distinction between exogenously and endogenously changing tastes is 
overcome, and the analysis concentrates on the essential problem with changing tastes, that 
preferences get reversed over time. This implies that dynamic choice is considered in a general 
framework. Furthermore, it allows to define what is meant by inconsistent dynamic choice, and 
what are the strategies available to the agent in this situation. 
A dynamic decision problem is defined as a problem where an agent takes a sequence of 
decisions over time, responding to situations which are a function of his own previous choices, and 
of randomly determined events. The dynamic decision problem, which is assumed to be bounded, is 
represented by a decision tree, composed by some initial chance or choice/decision node; a set of 
following choice or chance nodes, which define choices to be made by the agent or by nature, 
represented graphically by squares and circles respectively; and a set of terminal nodes or outcomes 
or consequences. 
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A plan for a decision problem consists of a complete specification of the choices to be made 
at one or more future moments in time, subject to different possible chance events taking place. In 
case there are only choice nodes, a plan will define a unique path through the tree, from an initial 
node to a terminal outcome. If there are also chance nodes, the (contingency) plan will specify the 
choices to be made at each choice node, where the choice node the agent finds himself at is also a 
function of random events. 
 
The problem of “essential inconsistency” is illustrated by Hammond (1976) in the following 
simple example, in which no chance event occurs, so that the situations are only a function of the 
agent’s choices. 
Suppose that an individual is considering whether to start taking an addictive drug. The 
individual would prefer at most to take the drug without consequences. However, he is certain that 
if he starts, he will become an addict, with serious consequences for his health. Of course, he can 
refuse to take the drug at the first place. This agent is facing a simple dynamic decision problem 
with the following structure: 
 
                                           a 
    n1 
       n0                                          b 
 
                                           c 
 
Figure 1 – The potential addict problem 
 
where three options are available to him, which represent plans to adopt, and lead to the 
following outcomes: 
• take the drug till it is harmless, then stop, which leads to outcome a 
• become an addict, which leads to outcome b 
• not take the drug, which leads to outcome c. 
At the initial decision node n0 the agent has to decide whether to take the drug or not, and his 
preferences are 
a ≻b , a ≻ c and c ≻ b. 
At choice node n1 he has become an addict, and therefore the only relevant preferences are 
those concerning a and b, and addiction itself means that b ≻a. 
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Thus, at n1 his initial preferences between a and b get reversed. The agent will choose b 
inconsistently with his previous choice of reaching for a. 
The problem of inconsistency with (exogenously or endogenously) changing preferences, 
comes from the fact that preferences get “reversed over time, and had the reversal been anticipated, 
quite a different option (such as c) might have been chosen” (Hammond 1976, page 162). 
The requirement of dynamic consistency is a requirement of consistency between planned 
choice and actual choice. It requires that the rational agent implements the plan originally adopted, 
“particularly when the choice of a plan is based on some systematic evaluation of alternative plans” 
(McClennen 1990, page 116), and in the absence of new information or involuntary error. Dynamic 
consistency may therefore be defined in terms of the disparity which may occur between the plan 
originally adopted by the agent and his subsequent choice. Dynamic consistency requires 
coincidence between what the agent is to choose at a certain node by the strategies judged 
acceptable at the beginning, and the continuations of the strategies from that point on, which are 
judged acceptable at that node. Thus, it formalises the intuition that changes in plans, not due to 
new information, induce the agent in a form of dynamic inconsistency1. 
In the example, the agent decides initially to take the drug, then stop - a, but chooses later not 
to stop - b. The choice of the agent at node n1 on the basis of the strategies acceptable at n0 - a - 
does not coincide with the continuation of the strategy at n1 which is acceptable at n1 - b. 
Hammond considers myopic and sophisticated choice as two possibilities available to an 
agent in such a situation of dynamic inconsistency, and the two strategies have the same 
characteristics anticipated by Strotz2. 
When acting according to a myopic approach, the agent treats choice at each decision point as 
unconnected with anything he could project on the choices he will make in the future. He selects at 
each point those strategies, or strategy continuations, which he judges acceptable from the 
perspective of that point. In this way, myopic choice involves a disparity between ex ante 
evaluations of ex post options, and ex post evaluations of the same options. 
                                                          
1 This notion of consistency, which is common to the literature on dynamic inconsistency and changing tastes considered above 
(Strotz, 1956, and others), has to be distinguished by another possible notion of consistency, which is present in Hammond (1982a,b), 
and does not impose restrictions on the agent’s behaviour as the definition considered here. At a given node in the decision tree, each 
choice by the agent is consistent with some particular plan. For any decision tree, it is possible to consider a truncated part of the tree 
starting from a given decision node. A truncated plan is that plan which is available to the agent from that decision point on. As for 
every truncated plan there exists a corresponding plan, each truncated plan is the continuation of a plan whose implementation has 
not been ruled out by the agent’s choice, so that the decision to implement that plan at the next node is consistent with the choices 
previously made. Then, any sequential choices will be consistent with each other, as they both are steps in the implementation of 
some plan. Therefore, an agent’s choice is dynamically consistent however the agent moves in the tree. 
2 However, it has to be noted that the focus of Hammond’s analysis is different. According to Hammond’s definitions, both strategies 
result in consistent dynamic choice, while they are always incoherent. Only in the case of no inconsistency, they coincide, and are 
coherent. 
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In Hammond’s example, the myopic agent ignores that his tastes are changing, and chooses at 
each stage the option he considers as best at that moment. Therefore, he will choose option a at n0, 
but change his mind and choose b at n1. His final choice will be b. 
When acting according to a sophisticated approach, the agent takes into account that the 
feasibility of any plan he can adopt in the future is conditioned by his projection of what options he 
will evaluate as acceptable at that point, and will reject as not feasible those plans which imply a 
choice he anticipates he will not make. By doing so, he always ends up choosing ex post according 
to his ex ante plans, and avoids violating dynamic consistency. 
The sophisticated agent anticipates his future choice and chooses the best plan among those 
he is ready to follow to the end. In the example, at n0 he will forecast that by taking the drug he will 
become an addict, and realises that his only options are b and c. Therefore he will choose the most 
preferred option between the two, that is, c. 
Hammond’s example of dynamic inconsistent choice allows also to introduce another 
possible model of behaviour, which is formalised only later in the literature by McClennen in the 
context of dynamic inconsistency and non-expected utility preferences, and is going to be discussed 
extensively below - Resolute Choice. 
Resolute choice stands as an alternative to sophisticated choice in tackling the problem of 
dynamic inconsistency. The resolute agent anticipates that the evaluation he is going to make at 
some future node in the decision tree is going to constrain the feasibility of a plan he judges as best 
at present, and then decides to “treat evaluation at the initial decision point as dispositive of 
evaluation in the future” (McClennen 1990, page 157). The agent resolves to act according to a plan 
judged best from an ex ante perspective, and intentionally acts on that resolve when the plan 
imposes on him ex post to make a choice he disprefers. By so choosing he manages to act in a 
dynamically consistent manner. 
In Hammond’s example, at n0 a resolute agent would have resolved to act according to the 
plan leading to the most preferred outcome a – take the drug till it is harmless, then stop; and he 
would have acted on that resolve when at n1 the plan imposed on him to choose the less preferred 
option - going for a and not for b. 
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2. Dynamic inconsistency with non-expected utility preferences 
The problem of dynamic inconsistency as examined in the literature on changing tastes occurs 
in situations of certainty. In a context of choice under risk or uncertainty, dynamically inconsistent 
choices may occur when the preference orderings over risky (uncertain) outcomes are non linear in 
the probabilities, that is, violate Expected Utility Theory, through violation of the Independence 
Axiom3. When applied to sequential decisions, non-linearity may cause optimal strategies to be 
dynamically inconsistent. 
This can be seen by considering the link between independence and linearity, and how 
violation of independence can cause dynamic inconsistency. 
Many formulations of the independence axiom are given in the literature. It is sufficient to 
consider here this version by Samuelson (1952a,b)4 corresponding to ‘strong independence’, which 
considers both the cases of strong preference and indifference: 
Lottery A is (as good or) better than lottery B, if and only if the compound 
lottery [A, p; Q, 1-p] is (as good or) better than the compound lottery [B, p; Q, 1-p] 
for any positive probability p and lotteries A, B and Q. 
That is, if lottery A is (as good or) better than lottery B, then any probability mixture of 
getting A or Q is (as good or) better than any probability mixture of getting B or Q, for any positive 
value of the probability p. In Samuelson’s words, “using the same probability to combine each of 
the two prizes with a third prize should have no ‘contaminating’ effects upon the ordering of those 
two original prizes” (1952b, p.133). 
 
As noted by Fishburn (1988), the Independence Axiom is known as the linearity assumption, 
and is associated with similar axioms referred to as substitution principles, cancellation conditions, 
additivity axioms and sure-thing principles. 
The contribution of the Independence Axiom to the demonstration of the existence of a utility 
function and of its linearity, a property which is referred to also as the expected utility hypothesis 
(the utility of a lottery is equal to the expected utility of its prizes) has been shown by many authors 
(Luce and Raiffa, 1957, Marschak, 1950; Kreps, 1988; Fishburn, 1988; Samuelson, 1952b). 
Machina (1989) notes that independence is equivalent to the property that the individual preference 
function takes the expected utility form, and according to Anand (1993) the notion of independence 
is “used in a sense that amounts to requiring that utility is linear with respect to probability”. 
                                                          
3 The problem of dynamic inconsistency may occur also when the preference orderings violate expected utility through violation of 
the Weak Ordering condition, as will be mentioned later. In the course of the following work, attention will be on the problem of 
inconsistency when independence is violated. 
4 This version of independence corresponds to the definition in Samuelson  (1952a), modified as in Samuelson (1952b). 
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Without providing a formal demonstration of the equivalence between linearity and 
independence, it will suffice to consider here the behavioural interpretation of linearity given by 
Machina (1987, 1991), which provides a clear example of the link between the two properties. 
The property of linearity in the probabilities can be considered as a restriction on an agent’s 
preferences concerning the probability mixtures of lotteries. Consider two probability distributions 
P and P* over a common set of outcomes, x. The probability mixture (α; 1-α) of the two lotteries P 
and P* will be equal to the compound lottery given by αP+(1-α)P* = αp1+(1-α)p1*,...,αpn+(1-
α)pn*. This can be viewed as a two-stage lottery, giving an α chance of P and a (1-α) chance of P*. 
As linearity implies that the utility of this two-stage lottery is equal to the sum of the expected 
utilities of the lotteries multiplied by the probabilities which mix them, the property of 
independence follows. 
That is, as 
ΣU(xi)(αpi+(1-α)pi*) = αΣU(xi)pi+(1-α)ΣU(xi)pi*, 
for the agent who maximises expected utility, if lottery P is preferred to lottery P*, then the 
probability mixture αP+(1-α)P** will be preferred to the mixture αP*+(1-α)P** for any positive α 
and P**. 
At this point, the property of independence can be given the following interpretation, which 
will turn useful below when the argument for dynamic inconsistency is introduced. The choice 
between αP+(1-α)P** and αP*+(1-α)P** is for the agent like tossing a coin which has a (1-α) 
chance of tail, and in this case the agent will get lottery P**, and having to decide before the coin is 
tossed whether, in case head turns out (with probability α), lottery P or P* is preferred. If the coin 
lands tail, the agent gets lottery P**; if it lands head, the agent is back to the choice between P and 
P*, and is supposed to rationally make the same choice as before. 
 
The argument for the dynamic inconsistency of non-expected utility preferences is illustrated 
first by Raiffa (1968). Raiffa frames the problem of inconsistent choice in a context of dynamic 
choice under risk, by showing that dynamic consistency is not compatible with the usual choices in 
an Allais paradox when this is considered as a decision problem in two stages. Raiffa reports of a 
similar example given by Schlaifer (1969). For this argument see also Markowitz (1959)5. 
Before introducing Raiffa’s argument, it is useful to illustrate the Allais paradox and show 
how it implies violation of expected utility and independence. 
 
                                                          
5 For a discussion of the plausibility of this argument see Anand (1993), which refers to McClennen (1988a). 
 
 
32 
2.1 An example of the Allais paradox 
Consider an agent who has to make a choice between the following couples of prospects, 
corresponding to the Allais paradox problem: 
a1=(1 chance of $1million) or 
a2=(.10 chance of $5million; .89 chance of $1million; .01 chance of $0) 
and 
a3=(.10 chance of $5million; .90 chance of $0) or 
a4=(.11 chance of $1million; .89 chance of $0). 
The typical (most common) preference pattern chosen by subjects in this problem (see 
Machina (1989) for references on the experimental evidence) is a1 over a2 and a3 over a4. This 
pattern of choice can be shown to violate the expected utility hypothesis. 
According to expected utility, the preference for a1 ≻ a2 implies that 
u($1M) ≻ .10u($5M) + .01u(0) + .89 u($1M), which can be rewritten as 
.11u($1M) + .89u(0) ≻ .10u($5M)) + .90u(0). 
Therefore, expected utility implies a4 ≻ a3 and not a3 ≻ a4. 
 
It is also possible to show how the pattern of choice considered violates the independence 
axiom. In order to show this, however, it is necessary to assume that the reduction of compound 
lotteries axiom (RCLA) holds. 
According to RCLA, any compound lottery, which has another lottery as one or more of its 
prizes, can be reduced to a simple lottery of the more basic prizes by operating with the 
probabilities. Consider the following formal definition of reduction formulated by Luce and Raiffa 
(1957): 
Reduction (RD). Any compound gamble is indifferent (I) to a simple gamble with 
outcomes o1,...,or, their probabilities being computed according to the ordinary probability 
calculus. 
In particular, if g(i) = (o1, p1(i); o2, p2(i);...;or, pr(i)), for i = 1,...s, 
then, (g(1), q1; g(2), q2;...;g(s), qs) I (o1, p1; o2, p2;...;or, pr), 
where p1 = q1 pi(1) + q2 pi(2) +...+qs pi(s). 
 
Given the RCLA, it is possible to rewrite the Allais prospects as 
a1 = (A, .11; $1M, .89) 
a2 =(B, .11; $1M, .89) 
a3 =(B, .11; $0, .89) 
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a4 =(A, .11; $0, .89), 
where A ≡ ($1M, 1) and B ≡ ($5M,10/11; $0,1/11). 
 
The decision trees corresponding to the above prospects are 
                       a1                                                               a2 
 
                                                                                                                $5M 
                                                                    10/11 
   .11                       $1M                 .11                      1/11 
                                                                                                                $0 
         .89                                                   .89 
                               $1M 
                                                                                                                $1M 
 
 
                      a3                                                                 a4 
 
                                         $5M 
         10/11 
       .11               1/11                                         .11                      $1M 
                                         $0 
   .89                                                              . 89 
                                                                                            $0 
                                         $0 
 
Figure 2 – Tree diagrams of the Allais paradox prospects with reduction 
 
The Samuelson definition of independence given above, implies the condition: 
A ≻ B   ⇔   [A, p; Q, 1-p] ≻ [B, p; Q, 1-p]   ∀Q, p. 
Having defined A ≡ ($1M, 1) and B ≡ ($5M,10/11; $0,1/11), it results that the condition 
above implies 
a1 ≻ a2   ⇔   A ≻ B   ⇔   a4 ≻ a3 
contrary to the usual Allais choices. 
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The condition considered above is a condition of static and counterfactual consistency. It 
states that if the agent had been offered a choice between A and B instead of the actual choice 
between [A, p; Q, 1-p] and [B, p; Q, 1-p], then his preference would be consistent as stated. 
The independence condition can be interpreted in terms of dynamic, instead of static, 
consistency in the manner illustrated by Raiffa. 
 
2.2 The dynamic inconsistency of non-expected utility agents 
Consider an urn containing 89 orange balls and 11 white balls. An agent has to draw from this 
urn one ball at random. If the ball is orange, the agent will receive a prize Q. If the ball is white, the 
agent will be given the choice between $1 million for sure (alternative A), or a lottery giving $5 
million with probability 10/11 and $0 with probability 1/11 (alternative B). 
At 8.55 in the morning the agent is asked to announce his choice between alternatives A and 
B, in case a white ball is drawn. That is, he is asked to choose ex ante between [A, p; Q, 1-p] and 
[B, p; Q, 1-p], with p = probability that a white ball is drawn. 
At 9 am the agent draws a white ball. 
At 9.05 the choice between A and B has to be made. That is, ex post the agent is asked to 
choose between A and B. 
There are two crucial questions here: 
• If a white ball is drawn, would the choice between A and B depend on the detailed 
description of prize Q? 
• If at 8.55 the alternative chosen has to be announced, in case a white ball is drawn, 
would the choice differ from the choice to be made at 9.05? 
If at 9.05 the agent is offered the choice between A and B, and at 8.55 he has declared he 
wants A, it would be dynamically inconsistent to change decision. Thus, 
(ex ante) [A, p; Q, 1-p] ≻ [B, p; Q, 1-p] ⇔ (ex post) A ≻ B 
as required by independence. 
If the agent is dynamically consistent in this way for any Q, it also follows that his ex ante 
choice must be independent of Q. 
In addition, if the agent’s choice between the sure payoff and the lottery at 9.05 is 
independent of what prize Q is going to be, then there is no reason to postpone declaring of 
preferences at 8.55, and choice at this time should not differ from choice at 9.05. 
Therefore, the answer to the above questions should be negative, and negative answers are 
consistent with the independence assumption. 
Moreover, in case the Q prize were $1 million, choice of A would correspond to choice of a1, 
and choice of B to choice of a2. In case the Q prize were $0, choice of A would correspond to 
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choice of a4, and choice of B to choice of a3. Therefore, the negative answers to the above 
questions, which are consistent with independence, are not compatible with choices for a1 and a3 (or 
a2 and a4) in the Allais paradox. 
Besides, choices compatible with the Allais paradox would imply that choice at different 
times would differ, leading the agent to dynamically inconsistent choices. 
If Q is $1 million, the agent will say that in the case of a white ball, he would choose B at 
9.05, but then at 9.05 he would instead choose A, being inconsistent with his previous choice, and 
with the negative answer to the two questions. 
 
Raiffa’s example shows how violation of expected utility may lead to dynamically 
inconsistent behaviour. Consider now the version of the argument given by Machina (1989, 1991). 
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3. The problem of dynamic inconsistency in Machina 
The problem of the dynamic inconsistency of non-expected utility agents when acting in a 
dynamic context has been introduced in the previous paragraph through the example by Raiffa 
(1968), which is one of the first and best known arguments of this kind. 
Machina constructs his argument of inconsistency by considering the violation of 
independence indirectly through violation of the separability properties which combine into the 
independence axiom. Machina’s argument 
• uses again the Allais paradox as an example of violation of the independence axiom 
in a static context; 
• shows how an agent with such non-expected utility preferences may incur into 
choices which are inconsistent when acting in a dynamic choice framework. 
• outlines - differently from Raiffa’s - the strategies which are available to the agent in 
a dynamic choice context, offering a solution to the dynamic inconsistency problem. 
As mentioned earlier, the characteristic property of the expected utility preference function is 
to be linear in the probabilities. This property does in turn imply that expected utility preferences 
are separable across mutually exclusive events. Separability can be of two different sorts: 
replacement and mixture separability6. The properties of separability (across events and/or 
sublotteries) can be combined in the independence axiom. 
According to replacement separability, an agent who prefers the lottery (y1,p1; x2, p2;…; 
xn,pn) to (x1,p1; x2, p2;…; xn,pn), would also prefer to replace (x1,p1) by (y1,p1) in any lottery of the 
form (x1,p1; x*2, p*2;…; x*m,p*m). This property is a direct expression of the fact that, due to the 
additive form of the expected utility function, the contribution to the sum of every utility/probability 
product does not depend on any of the other utility/probability products. 
According to mixture separability, an agent will prefer (y1,p1; x2, p2;…; xn,pn) to (x1,p1; x2, 
p2;…; xn,pn) if and only if he would prefer y1 to x1 in a direct choice between the two outcomes. 
This property directly derives from the fact that each element of the expected utility sum is the 
product of the utility of an outcome and its probability. The probability mixture of an outcome can 
be preferred to the same probability mixture of another outcome only if the utility of the first 
outcome is bigger than the utility of the second outcome, that is, if the first outcome is preferred to 
the second one. 
The two properties of separability (over events or sublotteries) can be combined in the 
independence axiom, as previously defined: 
                                                          
6 The two properties of separability also apply to mutually exclusive sublotteries of a compound lottery. 
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Lottery A is preferred (indifferent) to lottery B if and only if (A, p; Q, 1-p) is preferred 
(indifferent) to (B, p; Q, 1-p) for all lotteries Q and all positive probabilities p. 
As shown in Machina, the axiom of independence implies both mixture and replacement 
separability. 
The definition of independence implies directly mixture separability, as 
[A, p; Q, 1-p] ≻ [B, p; Q, 1-p] ⇔ A ≻B. 
Applying the condition twice gives replacement separability: 
[A, p; Q, 1-p] ≻ [B, p; Q, 1-p] ⇔A ≻B ⇔ [A, p; Q*, 1-p] ≻ [B, p; Q*, 1-p]. 
 
In this framework, the typical preferences in the Allais paradox can be shown to violate the 
independence axiom through violation of replacement separability over sublotteries. 
Consider an agent who has to make a choice between the pairs of prospects of an Allais 
paradox decision problem described above, and suppose that his preferences are for a1 ≻a2 and a3 
≻a4. 
Recalling the decision-tree representation of the Allais prospects when RCLA holds in Figure 
2, it can be seen that the agent who prefers a1 to a2 and a3 to a4 is willing to replace the sublottery 
($5M,10/11; $0,1/11) with $1M for sure when the lower branch yields $1M, but not when it yields 
$0. 
That is, for this agent 
($1M,.11; .89, $1M) ≻ (($5M,10/11; $0,1/11), .11; .89, $1M), but not 
($1M, .11; .89, $0) ≻ (($5M,10/11; $0,1/11),.11; .89, $0), 
in violation of replacement separability and of the independence axiom. 
 
3.1 Dynamic choice with Allais-type non-expected utility preferences 
Machina develops a specific example of dynamic inconsistency by using the typical non-
expected utility preferences in the Allais paradox. He notes, however, that the problem arises with 
any kind of violation of the independence axiom, through violation of replacement or mixture 
separability, and in general of any violation of expected utility. 
I shall consider this general argument first. Then, it will be straightforward to see how the 
application of this general argument for inconsistency to the specific lotteries and preference 
patterns of the Allais paradox allows to derive Machina’s specific example of inconsistency in a 
dynamic Allais paradox. 
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An agent faces a simple dynamic choice problem, where the dynamic aspect is given by the 
fact that the agent has to pre-commit his decision at the beginning of the tree - before any 
uncertainty is resolved - on how he will move if and when he reaches the decision node, and will 
actually have to move accordingly when he is there. Here, the agent has to pre-commit his choice at 
the decision node between lotteries A and B, in case he reaches it with probability p. 
 
                                                B 
                  Up 
    p 
                        Down             A 
1-p 
                                               Q 
 
Figure 3 – Dynamic decision tree which shows the potential inconsistency for any violation of 
the Independence Axiom 
 
If the agent’s preferences are of the kind considered above, that is, violate independence 
through violation of either replacement or mixture separability, for lotteries A, B and Q, and 
probability p, they will be of the form  
A ≻ B  but  (B, p ; Q,1-p) ≻ (A, p ; Q,1-p). 
Therefore, at the beginning of the decision tree the agent will plan to go Up, to get B at the 
choice node, before the uncertainty is resolved; but, after the uncertainty is resolved, when at the 
decision node (in case he arrives there) he will actually choose Down, to get lottery A. His 
behaviour will be dynamically inconsistent, as his actual choice at the decision node will differ 
from his planned choice for that node. 
 
Before introducing Machina’s example of inconsistency in a dynamic Allais paradox decision 
problem, I will consider how the specific example of dynamically inconsistent choice may be 
obtained by applying Machina’s general argument for inconsistency to the specific lotteries and 
preference patterns of the Allais paradox. 
Suppose that 
A = (1M, 1) 
B = (5M, 10/11; 0, 1/11) 
Q = 0 
p = .11, (1-p) = .89. 
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Then, the reasoning above when applied to the Allais prospects will imply: 
1. A ≻ B    that is, (1M, 1) ≻ (5M,10/11; 0,1/11), but 
2. (p,B; 1-p,Q) ≻ (p,A ; 1-p,Q)  (.11, (5M,10/11; 0,1/11); .89,0) ≻ 
        (.11, (1M,1); .89,0) 
       and 
3. (p,A; 1-p,A) ≻ (p,B; 1-p,A)   (.11,1M; .89,1M) ≻ (.11, (5M,10/11;  
        0,1/11); .89,1M). 
The preferences which result by applying the general argument for inconsistency to the Allais 
prospects show violation of replacement separability - therefore independence - under (2) and (3); 
violation of independence (through mixture separability) and inconsistency under (1) and (2); and 
no violation or inconsistency under (1) and (3). 
 
The above application of the general case of dynamically inconsistent preferences to the 
Allais paradox prospects allows to construct Machina’s specific example for the dynamic 
inconsistency of non-expected utility NEU agents with Allais-type preferences. 
Consider an agent who is facing the following decisions: 
a) a direct choice between the two prospects: B=(5M,10/11; 0,1/11); and 1M for sure 
(A); 
b) a choice on how to move in the two dynamic problems 
 
                                                5M                                                                         5M 
                               10/11                                                                   10/11 
                          1/11               0                                                      1/11                0 
.11                                                                   .11 
                                                1M                                                                         1M 
.89                                                                   .89 
 
                                                1M                                                                         0 
 
Figure 4 – Dynamic decision problems that generate the same opportunity sets as the Allais 
paradox problem 
 
The different choices the agent can make in these two trees imply the Allais paradox 
prospects considered above. 
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In the left hand-side tree, a choice of Up at the decision node, when combined with the 
probability at the initial chance node, implies the prospect a2=(.10 chance of $5M; .89 chance of 
$1M; .01 chance of $0). A choice of Down implies the prospect a1=(1 chance of $1M). 
In the right hand-side tree, a choice of Up implies a3=(.10 chance of $5M; .90 chance of $0). 
A choice of Down implies a4=(.11 chance of $1M; .89 chance of $0). 
An agent with the typical Allais non-expected utility preferences will act inconsistently. 
1. If his choice has been for B ≻ 1M (A). In case nature goes Up in the left hand-side 
tree, he will face exactly B and 1M, and decide to go Up (B), but change his plan to choose Down 
at the decision node (1M) instead of Up ( a1 ≻ a2). In the right hand-side tree, the agent will not be 
inconsistent. He will plan to go Up for a3 and will implement that decision when at the node. 
2. If his choice has been for 1M ≻ B. In case nature goes Up in the right hand-side tree, 
he faces B and 1M, and decides to go Down (1M), but changes his plan to choose Up at the 
decision node instead of Down (a3 ≻ a4). In the left hand-side tree, the agent will not be 
inconsistent: he will plan to go Down for a1 and will implement that decision when at the node. 
That is, the agent’s behaviour in either of the two dynamic problems will be dynamically 
inconsistent, whatever his choice in the direct alternative between the lottery and the sure outcome. 
 
3.2 The different approaches to choice available to the agent in a dynamic choice 
situation 
The argument on the dynamic inconsistency of non-expected utility agents sketched above 
relies on an assumption on the way in which the agent reconsiders his choice in the middle of a 
decision tree. In the previous example, when the problem occurred of determining how the agent 
would have moved had he actually reached the decision node, it has been assumed that he would 
have considered the tree starting at the decision node as a new decision tree. Thus, the 
reconsideration of the optimal strategy to be adopted at that point would depend only on the initial 
preferences and the outcomes/probabilities of the new tree. 
The uncertainty belonging to the rest of the tree - which has been cut off - does not matter for 
decision (in the example above, this uncertainty is the .89 probability of getting 1M in the left hand-
side tree; and the probability of getting 0 in the right hand-side tree). 
In the previous example, if this holds, decision at the choice node is determined only by the 
agent’s preferences regarding the outright choice between the lottery and the sure outcome. It 
follows that dynamically inconsistent behaviour of the agent in the previous situation is a 
consequence of this assumption.  
This assumption is referred to (Machina, 1989) as consequentialism. 
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The kind of agent who is non-expected utility and consequentialist (‘β -people’ for Machina) 
can be thought of being induced to dynamically inconsistent behaviour, by acting in a myopic 
manner, even if Machina does not refer to myopia explicitly. I shall refer to this agent as a straight 
inconsistent non-expected utility agent (NEU). 
 
An alternative to this approach would be to consider the uncertainty which has been already 
borne at the decision node as “gone in the sense of (…) consumed (or “borne”), rather than gone in 
the sense of irrelevant” (page 1647), by keeping the entire probability distributions into the 
opportunity sets, so that the agent will not confront at the node a new set of opportunities, but a 
subset of the original ones. In this way, the opportunities which were initially preferred, and 
corresponded to the initial plan, will always be available to him. In the example given, the agent 
will face at the choice node the same prospects that he was facing at the beginning of the tree. 
By so doing, he will manage to be dynamically consistent. I shall refer to this kind of agent as 
a Machina-dynamically consistent non-expected utility agent (MNEU). Machina refers to these 
agents as γ -people. 
This different approach suggested by Machina denies consequentialism as it “takes into 
account the risk already borne in a way consistent with the agent’s original preferences”. 
Let us consider now how such an approach can be formalised. The key feature of its 
formalisation lies in the way in which nonseparable non-expected utility preferences are 
“appropriately” extended to dynamic choice settings. 
 
In the previous example, the agent had the NEU Allais type preferences a1 ≻ a2 and a3 ≻ a4. It 
has been shown that, whatever his preferences over lottery B and 1M, he will act inconsistently in 
one of the two dynamic decision problems. Consider a1 ≻ a2 and B ≻ 1M, where a1 = (1M, 1) and 
a2 = (5M, .10; 1M, .89; 0, .01). As B = (5M, 10/11; 0, 1/11), it is possible to write a1 = (1M, .89;1M, 
.11) and a2 = (1M, .89;B, .11). 
Define V(1M, .89;1M, .11) and V(1M, .89;B, .11) as the preference functions over the two 
lotteries. 
a1 and a2 are the prospects the agent faces at the beginning of the left-hand-side tree of Figure 
4 in the previous paragraph. The inconsistency derives from the fact that when at the decision node, 
the prospects the agent faces are not a1 and a2, but B and 1M. 
According to Machina’s approach, the appropriate extension of NEU preferences to dynamic 
situations has to consider that the agent with non-expected utility preferences feels the risk which is 
gone as consumed, but not as irrelevant. This can be taken into account in two ways: 
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1. by inserting the whole probability distribution into the original preference function. 
At the choice node, the agent will compare .11) ;1M,.89 1M,(  V = and .11) B,;.89 1M,(  V =  - 
where the bar indicates the risk which has been already borne; that is, he will face the prospects 
a1 and a2. In this way the agent will choose a1 at the choice node - consistently with his choice at 
the beginning of the tree; 
2. by inserting the continuation of each tree branch in the conditional preference 
function V1M,.89=(•), so that he will compare V1M,.89=(1M, .11) and V1M,.89 = (B, .11), where it is 
defined that Vx1,p1;x2,p2(Z) = V(x1,p1; x2, p2; Z, (1-p1-p2). As above, the agent will face prospects 
a1 and a2 and choose a1, being consistent with his previous choice. 
Both procedures have the same effect on the agent’s behaviour: they allow the agent to 
implement at the choice node the plan adopted at the beginning of the decision problem, and 
therefore to be dynamically consistent. 
This model of choice is substantially equivalent, even if differently formalised, to 
McClennen’s model of Resolute Choice7, which will be discussed extensively below, so that I shall 
imply that a MNEU and a Resolute Chooser (RC) are the same kind of agent. 
There are still two kinds of agent which are to be considered. One is the expected utility (EU) 
agent (‘α -people’ for Machina), to whom the problem of dynamically inconsistent choice does not 
apply. 
The other agent is the Sophisticated Chooser (SC) (‘δ -people’ for Machina). 
As discussed previously, this agent determines the optimal strategy in the tree by a process of 
‘backward induction’: he starts from the last decision nodes in the tree, considers the set of 
prospects following from those nodes and determines the optimal choice at those nodes by using his 
original preferences. The process is repeated for all previous choice nodes, given the path so 
determined out of each terminal node, till the agent determines the path from each choice node to 
the beginning of the tree. The SC agent will be consistent, as he will follow at each node the 
optimal choices so determined when moving along the tree. 
In the example in Figure 4, the agent who prefers the lottery to the sure outcome, will forecast 
that he would go Up when at the decision node in the left hand-side tree, and will then pre-commit 
to go Up instead of Down when at the beginning of the tree (a2), therefore avoiding inconsistent 
behaviour in his future choice. In the right hand-side tree he will choose Up for a3. The agent who 
prefers the sure outcome to lottery B, will forecast that he would go Down in the right hand-side 
tree, and will therefore choose Down at the beginning of the tree (a4), avoiding inconsistency. In the 
left hand-side tree he will go Down for a1. Therefore, in this dynamic choice situation the SC agent 
                                                          
7 According to Machina, Resolute Choice represents one of the “antecedents of the formal approach” presented in his paper. 
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will behave as an EU agent, while exhibiting non-expected utility preferences in the static Allais 
problem of Figure 2. 
In the context of the simple dynamic choice problem considered, four different kinds of 
agents - or different approaches to choice available to the agent in a dynamic choice situation - can 
be outlined. An EU agent who will not be inconsistent. A NEU agent who is liable to inconsistency. 
A MNEU and a SC agent who are NEU agents but avoid inconsistent behaviour, even though the 
strategies they adopt and their choices differ. 
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4. Models of dynamic choice and dynamic choice conditions 
After having considered Raiffa’s and Machina’s formulations of the dynamic inconsistency 
problem, it may be useful to summarise the arguments by considering the decision trees and the 
different axioms implied by the arguments and choice strategies discussed above. 
The Allais pairs of prospects considered in Figure 2 can be represented by the following two 
decision trees, with choice of A being equivalent to a1=(1 chance of $1million), choice of B to 
a2=(.10 chance of $5million; .89 chance of $1million; .01 chance of $0), choice of C to a3=(.10 
chance of $5million; .90 chance of $0) and choice of D to a4=(.11 chance of $1million; .89 chance 
of $0). 
 
                             .10         5M                                        .10            5M 
               B           .01        0                                  C 
                            .89        1M                                         .90            0 
                                                                                       .11            1M 
               A                                                           D 
                                         1M                                        .89             0 
   (a)     (b) 
Figure 5 – Decision trees representing the Allais paradox prospects 
 
As considered above, given the RCLA reduction condition, these prospects are 
probabilistically equivalent to, respectively: 
 
 
                          10/11                     5M                                            10/11              5M 
                                                                                                                     
            .11          1/11                                                         .11                     1/11 
B              .89                                             0          C          .89                                           0 
 
 
                                                        1M                                                                     1M 
 
A               .11                                           1M          D            .11                                       1M 
 
        .89                                                                     .89 
                                                        1M                                                                     0 
   (a)      (b) 
Figure 6 – Decision trees representing the Allais paradox prospects with reduction 
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In Figure 6, the independence condition requires that 
A ≻ B ⇔(1M, 1) ≻ (5M, 10/11; 0, 1/11) ⇔ D ≻ C. 
Therefore, reduction and independence together require that A ≻ B ⇔ D ≻ C in Figure 5. 
 
Consider now the dynamic interpretation of the independence condition in the manner of 
Raiffa and Machina. Compare Figure 6 with the following dynamic decision problems which 
reverse the temporal order of the first decision node and the chance node and generate the same 
opportunity sets as the Allais paradox: 
 
                            10/11         5M                                                   10/11               5M 
                 B’                                                                          C’           
                             1/11         0                                                           1/11             0 
.11                                                                    .11 
                 A’                        1M                                            D’                          1M 
          .89                                                                             .89 
 
                                             1M                                                                         0 
  (a)      (b) 
Figure 7 – Dynamic decision trees which generate the same opportunity sets as the Allais 
paradox 
 
The condition of dynamic consistency requires that agent’s choices will be the same in the 
two sets of problems: the agent who prefers A to B in 6a will prefer A’ to B’ in 7a, and the agent 
who prefers D to C in 6b will prefer D’ to C’ in 7b. 
A ≻ B ⇔ A’ ≻ B’ and D ≻ C ⇔ D’ ≻ C’. 
 
Besides, in Figure 7 the condition of consequentialism according to Machina (1989) requires 
that A’ ≻ B’ ⇔ D’ ≻ C’, as the consequences of these prospects are identical in the two pairs of 
decision trees. That is, according to consequentialism, in Figure 7 the payoff at the end of the 
lowest branch is not relevant at the decision node. 
Therefore, dynamic consistency and consequentialism together require that 
A ≻ B ⇔ D ≻ C in Figure 6. So reduction, dynamic consistency and consequentialism 
together require that A ≻ B ⇔ D ≻ C in Figure 5. 
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Therefore, it results that whoever offers an Allais-type response in Figure 5 must violate at 
least one of reduction, dynamic consistency and consequentialism. 
 
Recalling the different strategies available to the agent in this situation, it is possible to see 
that the straight NEU myopic agent will violate independence and therefore dynamic consistency 
but respect consequentialism and reduction, so that in Figures 5 and 6, A ≻ B and C ≻ D, while in 
Figure 7 A’ ≻ B’ and D’ ≻ C’. 
A dynamically consistent MNEU agent will respect reduction and dynamic consistency, while 
violating consequentialism, so that A ≻ B and C ≻ D in Figures 5 and 6, while A’ ≻ B’ and C’ ≻ 
D’ in 7. 
A SC sophisticated agent will obey consequentialism and dynamic consistency, so that A ≻ B 
and D ≻ C in Figures 6 and A’ ≻ B’ and D’ ≻ C’ in 7, but violate reduction, as for this agent A ≻ 
B and C ≻ D in Figure 5. 
 
So far I have considered the argument on the dynamic inconsistency of non-expected utility 
agents through the examples of Raiffa and Machina, and the different models of dynamic choice 
discussed by Machina. 
It is important to note that other authors have discussed the issue of the linearity of the 
expected utility function and dynamic inconsistency. Karni and Safra (1989a) show that linearity of 
expected utility is a necessary and sufficient condition for dynamic consistency in ascending bid 
auctions. Karni and Safra (1990) argue also that the same is true in the more general case where the 
set of choices is not restricted to lotteries induced by auctions. 
In the next paragraph I will consider McClennen’s approach to the problem of the dynamic 
inconsistency of individuals with non-expected utility preference patterns. The discussion will 
illustrate the conditions of dynamic choice and the different models of behaviour in a dynamic 
context through some examples, leaving the formal part of McClennen’s argument in the Appendix. 
This will allow to examine further the myopic and sophisticated models of choice, and illustrate the 
model proposed by McClennen as an alternative solution to the problem of dynamic inconsistency - 
Resolute Choice. 
Before introducing McClennen’s argument, it is useful to illustrate briefly the general 
theoretical debate in which the dynamic inconsistency argument finds its place and McClennen’s 
argument develops. 
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The problem of the dynamic inconsistency of non-linear preference orderings is part of the 
general debate on the justification of expected utility as a normative theory. On the basis of a 
growing empirical evidence of systematic violations of expected utility maximisation, many non-
expected utility models have been formulated (for references see Machina, 1989). Most of these 
models maintain the ordering and continuity conditions and relax or generalise the independence 
axiom, which accounts for the linearity in the probabilities. Many different arguments have been 
formulated against non-expected utility models, in the context of static as well as dynamic choice 
(Machina, 1989; McClennen, 1990). According to Machina, the problem of dynamic inconsistency 
is one of the most “formidable” arguments against the validity of these models as normative for 
choice under risk and uncertainty and in support of the normative superiority of expected utility. 
Hammond’s consequentialist argument (1988a,b;1989) is the most formal normative 
justification of expected utility 
According to Hammond's consequentialist argument, violations of one of the two expected 
utility axioms of ordering and independence make the agent's preferences subject to dynamically 
inconsistent changes. If this occurs, the agent may find himself in a dynamic choice situation in 
which what at the present moment he prefers to choose at a later point in the decision tree is not 
what he will prefer to choose when he actually arrives at that decision point. 
The problem with dynamically inconsistent shifts in preferences is that they are not 
compatible with the agent always maximising with respect to his preferences for consequences. The 
agent may act according to a plan that is strictly dominated by another available plan with respect to 
preferences for outcomes. 
Hammond argues that the consequentialist principle– that acts have to be valued only by their 
consequences - suffices for the derivation of the axioms of ordering and independence, which are 
implied by consequentialism, given a condition of consistency. In particular, Hammond shows that 
ordering and independence can be recovered as theorems under an axiomatic formalisation of the 
principle of consequences. 
 
 
48 
5. The problem of dynamic inconsistency in McClennen 
McClennen (1986,1990) develops his contribution to the analysis of the dynamic 
inconsistency problem in the context of the debate on the normative validity of expected utility 
theory and two of its axiomatic presuppositions, the principles of weak ordering and independence. 
The discussion concentrates on the justification from a pragmatic perspective of a normative 
interpretation of the two axioms, that is, the justification of “the claim that a rational decision maker 
ought to avoid violating these two principles” (McClennen 1990, page 3). 
McClennen's contribution to the debate focuses on the discussion of what he considers the 
most formal and complex of the pragmatic arguments in defence of the two axioms of ordering and 
independence, Hammond's consequentialist argument. In common with the other pragmatic 
arguments, this includes reference to a dynamic choice framework. 
McClennen constructs his argument by introducing a set of conditions for rational dynamic 
choice, which have the purpose of factoring Hammond's consequentialist principle. The conditions 
provide a model for the consequentialist argument constructed in favour of the two axioms: 
McClennen shows that the same two axioms can be recovered as theorems from the conjunction of 
the dynamic choice conditions. Moreover, the conditions play an important role in a more general 
pragmatic approach. 
It is of particular interest to consider how McClennen uses the rational dynamic choice 
conditions to model agent’s behaviour in a dynamic choice context. For this purpose, it is sufficient 
to give here only a description of the conditions necessary to follow McClennen’s construction. A 
more detailed notation and formal definitions of the conditions and models of choice are given in 
the Appendix. 
 
5.1 Some notation and definitions 
A dynamic choice problem, as defined in section 1 above, is represented by a decision tree T, 
composed by initial chance or choice nodes, a set of following choice or chance nodes, and a set of 
terminal nodes or outcomes O(T) = {o1, ..., on} associated with T. In line with the assumption of the 
decision problem to be bounded, it is assumed that an outcome is not terminal, insofar as chance 
events and probabilities enter explicitly into its description. 
Define S as the set of plans available to the agent in T, and s, r, ... as elements of S. For any 
decision tree T, it is possible to define T(ni) as the truncated part of the tree from node ni to all 
terminal nodes that can be reached from ni. s(ni) will be a representative truncated plan available to 
the agent at point ni and S(ni) the set of truncated plans available at ni. 
Before introducing the rational choice conditions it is useful to consider (more formally in the 
Appendix) a crucial problem in McClennen’s approach - the evaluation of plans and the different 
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perspectives from which plans can be evaluated. The difference in the perspectives of evaluation are 
the basis for the differences in the conditions and models of dynamic choice. 
i. The evaluation of plans 
D(S) is defined as the set of acceptable plans, that is, the subset of S consisting of those plans 
judged by the agent to be acceptable, by whatever criteria is employed. 
ii. The evaluation of plans at subsequent nodes 
According to McClennen there are three different perspectives from which the agent who 
finds himself at a certain (chance or choice) node ni in a tree T can evaluate the plans available at 
that point. These give rise to three different kinds of evaluation: 
· Evaluation of truncated plans. This concerns the evaluation of the alternatives 
available to the agent at node ni from the perspective of node ni itself. Given that the agent 
finds himself at some node ni, he will face the truncated tree T(ni), and will have to evaluate 
the set of plans S(ni) available to him at ni. 
· Evaluation of plan continuations. This concerns the evaluation of all the possible 
plans available to the agent before any move - by nature or by the agent - has taken place. For 
each truncated plan s(ni) available at ni, there must exist some plan s, such that s(ni) is the 
continuation of s from the point ni on. At ni the agent can perceive he faces not a set of 
truncated plans, but a set of plan continuations. From this perspective, the agent will have to 
consider which of all the plan continuations he is actually facing were considered acceptable 
by him initially. Then, it is possible to define for any node ni the set of all acceptable plans 
that the agent can still implement from ni. 
· Evaluation of truncated plans as de novo trees. This concerns the evaluation of the 
agent in the case he is given a ‘de novo’ decision problem identical to the one he is 
considering. The perspectives of evaluation considered above concern the general problem of 
how the agent should choose at a certain point within a decision tree. Choice so intended has 
a background of past choices and events, of paths that are “collateral but now counterfactual” 
(page 106). However, it is possible to consider the agent as facing, at some node ni, a 
completely new decision tree; a full tree that starts de novo at node ni and is like T(ni) except 
for “having no history and collateral paths”. 
 
Prospects. For any tree T and plan s in S, a prospect gs - associated with plan s - is assumed to 
consist of a well-defined probability distribution over a set of outcomes, which can be reached by 
implementing plan s. The notion of prospects presupposes that the agent’s preference ordering over 
gambles satisfies the condition of reduction RD (defined in 2.1). This means that the agent is 
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indifferent to gambles that can be reduced to the same probability distribution over the same set of 
outcomes. 
A more formal definition of a prospect is to be found in the Appendix. 
 
5.2 Dynamic choice conditions 
McClennen considers four conditions or principles of rational dynamic choice, together with 
other conditions which enter in their definition: Simple Reduction, Normal and Extensive form 
Coincidence, Dynamic Consistency, Separability. 
As noted above, definition and discussion of the dynamic choice conditions is central in 
McClennen’s analysis, as all the dynamic models of choice which McClennen develops are defined 
through the conditions that they violate or observe. Therefore, in what follows I will try to consider 
the part of the discussion which is necessary to understand McClennen’s argument, while leaving 
the more formal part of the definitions and discussion in the Appendix. 
 
5.2.1 Conditions of reduction 
Simple Reduction (SR) 
SR (as defined in the Appendix) is the extension to dynamic choice of the simple reduction 
condition RD previously defined. According to SR, the decision tree problem is equivalent to a 
simple non-sequential choice among different gambles, where n0 is the only choice node in the tree, 
and all other nodes are chance nodes. This condition requires that the ranking of plans in this kind 
of dynamic choice problem depends on the ranking of the outcomes or prospects associated with 
those plans. Thus, it requires that the evaluation that the agent makes of the prospects, and his 
subsequent choice, rules the evaluation and choice of strategies. The condition is plausible, if the 
RD version of the condition - that only outcomes and probability distributions are important in 
evaluation of gambles - holds in static choice. SR not only implies that RD holds, but is the 
extension of RD to a dynamic context. 
Plan Reduction (PR) 
This condition extends the previous SR, by eliminating the requirement that the plan be 
implemented by a single initial choice (see the Appendix for a formal definition). This is in line 
with the consideration that a plan has no value in itself, but that its value depends only on the value 
of the prospects attached to the plan and their probabilities. Then, if two plans lead to prospects 
which are considered equivalent, the two plans are to be judged equivalent. The condition is stated 
in terms of acceptable plans. It requires a coincidence between acceptable sets over prospects and 
acceptable sets over plans that map into those prospects. 
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The SR condition of reduction is more limited than PR, and therefore directly implied by it. 
Besides, by “factoring” PR (as shown in the Appendix), it is possible to see that PR adds to SR the 
requirement that, insofar as evaluation is concerned, no distinction exists between plans in normal 
and extensive form. 
In order to explain the difference between normal and extensive form of a plan, one can 
consider a plan s in S(T), where T is modified so that the agent can implement any plan in T by 
means of a single choice, for example, by the existence of a mechanism which automatically 
performs from the start all the choices required by plan s, and consider this as the normal form 
version of the plan. Given the normal form of s and the normal version of T, then, it is possible to 
formulate the condition of: 
Normal-form/extensive form coincidence (NEC). 
NEC (formally defined in the Appendix) implies that there is no difference to choice whether 
the agent is presented with the extensive or the normal form version of any plan8. 
While PR ensures the coincidence between the set of acceptable plans and the set of the 
corresponding acceptable prospects, NEC ensures the coincidence between the set of acceptable 
plans associated with a tree and the set of acceptable normal form plans associated with the same 
tree. 
There exists a relation between the conditions SR, NEC and PR. McClennen establishes the 
relation formally through two propositions, which prove that PR is equivalent to the conjunction of 
NEC and SR. The formal demonstration of the propositions will not be given here. However, the 
link connecting the different conditions of reduction will be better understood below, when the 
principles of rational dynamic choice are used to define the different models of choice in the 
context of a dynamic decision tree. 
 
5.2.2 Dynamic consistency (DC) 
As mentioned in paragraph 1, dynamic consistency is defined in terms of the “disparity 
between the plan originally adopted and subsequent choice” (McClennen 1990, page 118). As it is 
assumed that the plan adopted by the agent is a plan that he judges acceptable at the initial decision 
point, and that the plan chosen at any subsequent point is among the truncated plan judged 
acceptable from that standpoint, dynamic consistency requires coincidence between what the agent 
chooses at a certain node by the strategies judged acceptable at the outset, and the set of the strategy 
continuations from that point on, which are judged acceptable at that node. 
More specifically, the condition of dynamic consistency requires a relation between the set of 
plans judged acceptable by the agent (in particular what it implies about the set of plans that the 
                                                          
8 A thorough explanation of what is meant by normal and extensive form is not given in McClennen, as noted by Cubitt (1996). 
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agent can still implement from a particular choice node), and the set of truncated plans judged 
acceptable which are available to the agent at the subsequent choice node under consideration. 
Formally, the DC condition of dynamic consistency is obtained by the combination of two 
different conditions – of Inclusion (DC-INC) and Exclusion (DC-EXC). The formal definition of 
the two conditions and of the resulting dynamic consistency is given in the Appendix. 
 
5.2.3 Separability (SEP) 
Separability requires that the evaluation of the options still available to the agent at some 
point within the decision tree be independent of the context of chance events and choices already 
occurred. That is, how the agent would choose if he were to confront choices de novo determines 
how he chooses at any given point in the tree. Therefore, the condition requires coincidence 
between the set of strategy continuations judged acceptable at a particular decision point and the set 
of strategies which would be judged acceptable by the agent if he were to confront the sub-tree 
starting at that decision node as a new decision tree. 
This condition of separability requires that how an agent will choose among different 
alternatives at a node in the decision tree is determined by the way he would choose among those 
alternatives de novo. That is, the choice of the agent at a node ni in the decision tree does not 
depend on “what might have happened, or what alternatives might have been available, under 
conditions that do not in fact obtain at choice point ni”, that is on “alternative but counterfactual 
choices or moves by nature” (page 122). 
The role of the SEP condition can be better understood by considering a condition of 
reduction on truncated plans, TR, which generalises the plan reduction condition PR to the case 
where ni =n0, and therefore directly implies it. 
TR (defined in the Appendix) requires the ordering of the set of plan truncations to depend 
only on the ordering of the prospects associated to them - which the agent can still have at one node 
in the tree - so that once the ordering of prospects of a truncated tree is known, the ordering of plan 
truncations is also known, independently of the rest of the tree. 
An important implication of this is that the ordering of the truncated plans at a node ni in the 
tree is independent of the prospects that might have been open to the agent earlier in the tree, had 
the agent chosen differently, or had nature moved differently at choice or chance nodes before ni. 
In particular, it can be shown (for this see the Appendix) that by factoring TR, it is possible to 
derive TR by PR by adding the condition of separability SEP to it. Therefore, the SEP condition is 
what has to be added to PR in order to get TR. 
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5.3 Different models of dynamic choice 
As discussed previously, two different approaches to choice have been traditionally 
considered in the literature on dynamic choice and changing preferences: myopic and sophisticated 
choice. McClennen evaluates and compares these dynamic choice models in terms of the conditions 
on dynamic choice considered above, and formulates the new approach of Resolute Choice. 
The way of framing the choice strategies in dynamic choice situations with a potential for 
inconsistency follows Strotz’s analysis. However, despite the definition of the strategies differs, the 
decision context of McClennen’s analysis is the same considered by Hammond - of dynamic 
inconsistency caused by non-expected utility non-linear preferences. 
Following McClennen’s analysis, I will use the same simple dynamic decision problem to 
evaluate the three different decision models in terms of the dynamic conditions. 
As an example of the application of Strotz’s perspective to Hammond’s problem, consider the 
following decision problem described by McClennen, and originally formulated by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). 
Suppose an individual is facing the following prospects: 
g1 = ($2400, 1) 
g2 = ($2500, 33/34; $0, 1/34) 
g3 = ($2400, 34/100; $0, 66/100) 
g4 = ($2500, 33/100; $0, 67/100) 
where g1 means that the agent will get $2400 with certainty; g2 means that he will get $2500 
with probability 33/34, and $0 with probability 1/34, and so on. 
In what follows it is going to be assumed that the agent prefers g1 to g2, and g4 to g3. This 
preference pattern corresponds to a class of violation of expected utility theory and the 
independence axiom, known as the “common ratio effect”. 
According to expected utility, the preference for g1 ≻ g2 implies that 
u($2400) ≻ 33/34u($2500) + 1/34u($0), which can be rewritten as 
34/100u($2400)+66/100u($0) ≻ 33/100u($2500) + 1/100u(0)+66/100u($0) or 
34/100u($2400)+66/100u($0) ≻ 33/100u($2500) + 67/100u($0). 
Therefore, expected utility implies g3 ≻ g4 and not g4 ≻ g3. 
It is also possible to show how the pattern of choice considered violates the independence 
axiom. Given the RCLA, it is possible to rewrite the prospects as 
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g1 = (A) 
g2 = (B) 
g3 = (A, 34/100; $0, 66/100) 
g4 = (B, 34/100; $0, 66/100), 
where A ≡ ($2400, 1) and B ≡ ($2500,33/34; $0,1/34). 
As argued above, the condition implied by independence is: 
A ≻ B   ⇔   [A, p; Q, 1-p] ≻ [B, p; Q, 1-p]   ∀Q, p. 
Having defined A ≡ ($2400, 1) and B ≡ ($2500,33/34; $0,1/34), it results that the condition 
above implies 
g1 ≻ g2   ⇔   A ≻ B   ⇔   g3 ≻ g4. 
Following Machina’s analysis, the preferences in the common ratio effect problem can be 
shown to violate the independence axiom through violation of mixture separability over 
sublotteries. 
Recalling the representation of the prospects when RCLA holds, it can be seen that the agent 
who prefers g1 to g2 and g4 to g3 prefers the lottery ($2400, 1) to the lottery ($2500,33/34; $0,1/34) 
in a direct choice between the two, but not when they are mixed with the other lottery ($0, 66/100). 
That is, for this agent 
($2400, 1)≻ ($2500,33/34; $0,1/34), but not 
($2400, 34/100; $0, 66/100) ≻ (($2500,33/34; $0,1/34)), 34/100; $0, 66/100), 
in violation of mixture separability and of the independence axiom. 
 
Suppose now that this other prospect is also available 
g3+ = ($2401, 34/100; $1, 66/100), 
where the agent can have slightly higher payoffs with the same probability than in g3. If g4 is 
strictly preferred to g3 it is always possible to construct g3+ so that very small increments in g3 will 
still result in a prospect less preferred than g4, so that the agent will prefer g4 to g3+ and g3+ to g3. 
The choice of the agent among these prospects can be represented by the following decision 
tree, once the notation and definitions considered above are assumed. 
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                                                                                       33/34                    $2500 
                                                                       n4 
                                               s(n3)                                         1/34 
                                       n3                                                                         $0 
                                                            r(n3) 
                                  34/100                                                                       $2400 
           n1 
                                   66/100 
             s, r                                                                                                  $0 
        n0 
 
 
      (r+)                                  34/100                                                        $2401 
            n2 
                                               66/100                                                        $1 
 
Figure 8 – Decision tree representing choice of a variation of the “common ratio effect” 
prospects 
 
Consider the options available to the agent in this situation. 
At the first choice node n0 the agent is facing the possibility of choosing plan s or plan r, by 
going Up at choice node, or going Down by choosing (r+) and getting prospect g3+. In case he 
chooses to go Up at n0, he is in fact facing the two prospects g3 and g4. In case at n3 he chooses 
s(n3), he will get (($2500, 33/34; $0, 1/34) with probability 34/100; and $0 with probability 66/100), 
which is just g4 = ($2500, 33/100; $0, 67/100). In case at n3 he chooses r(n3), he will get (($2400, 
with probability 34/100; and $0 with probability 66/100), which is just g3 = ($2400, 33/100; $0, 
66/100). 
According to McClennen there are three different models of behaviour which the agent can 
adopt in this dynamic decision problem – Myopic Choice, Sophisticated Choice and Resolute 
Choice. 
 
5.3.1 Myopic Choice (MC) 
When acting according to a myopic approach, the agent selects at each point the strategies, or 
strategy continuations, which he judges acceptable from the perspective of that point. 
Remind that the agent prefers g1 to g2 and g4 to g3 (and to g3+). Therefore. he will choose plan 
s at n0 in order to choose s(n3) at node n3. However, in case he actually finds himself at node n3, the 
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agent will in fact decide to go for r(n3) and drop s(n3), as he is now facing prospects g1 and g2 and 
prefers the first to the latter. 
Therefore, when faced with this decision problem, at n0 the agent will choose plan s, while at 
n3 he will choose the plan continuation r(n3) instead of the continuation of the plan originally 
adopted s(n3), then behaving in a dynamically inconsistent manner - adopting a plan and leaving it 
at a later node. 
McClennen uses the conditions of dynamic choice defined above to offer a model of the 
agent’s behaviour. A detailed description of how this is done can be found in the Appendix. Here it 
is sufficient to conclude that the agent who has the preferences considered above – that is, who 
ranks g1 over g2 and g4 over g3 - and follows all three conditions SR, NEC (which together imply 
PR) and SEP, will select plan s at n0 and r(n3) at node n3. In this way, he will violate the condition 
of dynamic consistency DC. 
PR requires coincidence between acceptable sets over prospects and acceptable sets over 
plans that map into those prospects. Given the agent’s preferences for g4 over g3, g4 is in the set of 
acceptable prospects, while g3 is not. Thus, according to PR plan s is in the set of acceptable plans, 
while plan r is not. 
According to SEP, the agent will choose at n3 as if facing a new tree. Then, for SR at the new 
tree starting at n3, the prospect associated with plan s is g2 and the prospect associated with plan r is 
g1. Then, r will be in the set of acceptable plans, s will not. Then, for PR (SR+NEC) and SEP, the 
agent will select s at n0 and r at n3, violating DC. 
This kind of behaviour corresponds to the myopic choice model of behaviour introduced by 
Strotz. 
 
5.3.2 Sophisticated Choice (SC) 
When acting according to a sophisticated approach, the agent always makes his ex post choice 
according to his ex ante plans, and avoids violating dynamic consistency. The SC agent will avoid 
choosing inconsistently with the plan adopted at the start, by restricting the set of feasible plans. 
Besides, the sophisticated agent is committed to SEP, as his preferences over options at a future 
time are only shaped by considerations for those consequences that remain realisable at that future 
time, and abstract from earlier evaluations. He violates NEC, allowing for a disparity between how 
he evaluates outcomes abstractly considered and strategies which access those outcomes. 
Consider the behaviour predicted by this strategy in the above example. 
When at the starting choice node n0, the SC agent will anticipate that by moving Up towards 
n1 he will choose r(n3) over s(n3) in case chance takes him at node n3. Then, he will consider plan s 
as not feasible. Therefore, having dropped s, which constitutes a choice of g4, he is now confronting 
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the two plans which lead to prospects g3 and g3+, that is, r and (r+) respectively. As, by assumption, 
g3+ is preferred to g3, the agent will decide to adopt plan (r+) at the start. 
In order to see how the conditions of rational dynamic choice can offer a model of the agent’s 
behaviour in the SC case, it is necessary to consider a refinement of the reduction conditions, and 
their relation with SC. This will be done in detail in the Appendix, and applied to the decision 
problem in the example. 
From the refinement of the reduction conditions it will result that the SC agent makes choice 
as required by the SR, SEP and DC conditions; but - when he faces a potential violation of DC - he 
commits only to a restricted modified form of PR. This modification of PR is characterised by a 
rejection of the NEC condition as applicable to all possible plans available to the agent at n0. 
PR requires that the set of acceptable plans coincides with the set of acceptable prospects. 
NEC requires that the acceptable set of plans associated with any tree coincides with the 
acceptable set of normal form (NF) plans associated with the same tree. Taking any tree T – like the 
one in Figure 8 – and modifying it so that at the outset the agent can implement any plan in T with a 
single choice, one gets a tree Tn – like the one in Figure 8a - which is the normal version of T. A 
plan sn in Tn is the normal version of plan s in T. 
 
                                                                                       33/34                     $2500 
 
                                             34/100                                    1/34 
                                                                                                                     $0 
                                                                           66/100                               $0 
              
              
     sn 
                                                                         34/100                                  $2400 
        n0                                          rn 
                                                                         66/100                                  $0 
  
   r+n                               34/100                                                                    $2401 
                   
                                        66/100                                                                    $1 
 
Figure 8a – Decision tree Tn representing the normal form version of the tree in Figure 8 
 
 
 
58 
According to NEC, the acceptable set of plans in T coincides with the acceptable set of plans 
in Tn. 
SR requires that the set of acceptable plans coincides with the set of acceptable prospects if 
the decision tree is equivalent to a simple non-sequential choice among lotteries, where n0 is the 
only choice node in the tree, and all other nodes are chance nodes. According to SR, the acceptable 
set of NF plans in Tn coincides with the acceptable set of corresponding prospects. 
But plans in Tn and in T map into the same prospects, so that sn and s map into g4, rn and r 
map into g3, and r+n and r+ map into g3+. 
The SC agent violates NEC, as the acceptable set of plans in T do not coincide with the 
acceptable set of plans in Tn. In Tn plan sn - leading to prospect g4 - is in the acceptable set, while in 
T plan s is not in the acceptable set. 
However, the SC agent maintains SR, which is a rather slack condition: the acceptable sets of 
plans in Tn coincides with the acceptable sets of corresponding prospects: if g4 is acceptable, sn is 
acceptable. 
By violating NEC, the SC agent violates PR, as the set of acceptable plans in T does not 
coincide with the set of acceptable prospects. g4 is acceptable, but s is not in the set of acceptable 
plans, as acceptable plans in Tn and in T do not coincide. 
An agent who accepts the conditions SR, SEP and DC and rejects NEC provides a model for 
Hammond’s sophisticated choice and Strotz’s consistent planning. 
 
5.3.3 Resolute Choice (RC) 
The characteristic feature of the sophisticated choice strategy is that of avoiding dynamic 
inconsistency. According to McClennen, in the literature concerned with dynamic inconsistency, 
sophisticated choice is considered the only strategy which offers a solution to the problem, with the 
exception of Johnsen and Donaldson (1985)9. Resolute choice is an alternative to sophisticated 
choice in solving the problem of dynamic inconsistency. As seen above, the resolute agent resolves 
to act according to a plan judged best from an ex ante perspective, and intentionally acts on that 
resolve when the plan imposes on him ex post to make a choice he disprefers. By so choosing he 
avoids to act in a dynamically inconsistent manner. 
However, the resolute agent violates the separability condition: he does not evaluate outcomes 
at tree continuation points as he would evaluate them de novo. A disparity exists between how the 
resolute agent evaluates options ex post and how he evaluates the same options de novo. Violation 
of separability means that choice at decision nodes within the tree cannot be explained only with 
                                                          
9 As previously discussed, Machina (1989) formulates a model of dynamic choice behaviour alternative to SC, and substantially 
equivalent to RC. In his paper are also references of other formal antecedents of his formulation: Anand (1987), Donaldson and 
Selden (1981), Machina (1981), Loomes and Sugden (1986), Yaari (1985), McClennen, (1988a,1988b,1990), which is RC itself. 
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reference to the options that the agent confronts at those points: his preferences over options at a 
future time do not abstract from earlier evaluations. 
Consider this in more detail. A more formal description is given in the Appendix. 
Sophisticated choice avoids dynamic inconsistency by making ex post choice behaviour shape 
ex ante choice of a plan. However, the condition of dynamic consistency only requires consistency 
between present and future choice, but does not specify how this choice is found, on which basis to 
determine what alternative is best at a future given point. 
Sophisticated choice gives an answer to the problem of dynamic inconsistency by specifying 
that choice at the initial node is constrained by expected choices at each following node. 
Resolute Choice adopts the opposite perspective: it makes choice of a plan judged best ex 
ante shape ex post behaviour. 
Compare the behaviour prescription of SC and RC in the decision problem given in the 
example of Figure 8. SC makes the agent choose plan (r+), even if the agent would prefer s if it 
were feasible. RC makes the agent choose s and then “intentionally choose” s(n3) when he gets to 
node n3. 
The RC agent resolves to implement the plan he originally adopted - despite this implies at 
some future node choice(s) that the agent would not have liked to make - and therefore behaves 
consistently. Besides, by moving through the tree for implementing his initial plan, the RC agent 
shows his commitment to the NEC condition, as he does not consider the difference between the 
normal and extensive form of plans. However, observing the DC condition in this way, forces the 
agent to introduce a difference in the way he values the same alternatives at a given node in the tree, 
and the way he would value them if he faced a new decision tree starting at that choice node. 
In the previous example, the RC agent ranks plan s - which requires choice of s(n3) and allows 
to get prospect g4 - over plan r - which requires choice of r(n3) and allows to get prospect g3. In case 
the agent reaches node n3, he implements his decision, and chooses s(n3), despite the fact that he 
would have chosen r(n3) over s(n3) in an outright choice between the two, if these two alternatives 
had been the only two plans of a de novo decision tree starting at n3. Therefore, in avoiding 
dynamic inconsistency, the RC agent violates the separability condition SEP. 
Violation of SEP means that the agent does not choose at a node in the decision tree by 
abstracting from choices or moves by nature which could have been available under conditions that 
do not occur at that choice node - “alternative but counterfactual choices or moves by nature”. In 
the example, in order to observe SEP, the agent should have considered as irrelevant at node n3 
what might have happened at node n1 (the probability of 66/100 of getting $0), but did not occur, 
since he is now at n3. If the agent considered that event as relevant at n3, then he would cut off that 
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branch from the tree, and face only a tree starting at n3, that is, prospects g1 and g2. By violating 
SEP, the agent considers that branch as relevant, and therefore faces prospects g3 and g4 instead. 
For this agent, as Machina (1989) phrases it, “risk which is borne but not realised is gone in 
the sense of having been consumed, rather than gone in the sense of irrelevant” (page 1647). 
 
 
61 
6. Other models for Sophisticated Choice 
The strategy of sophisticated choice has been previously considered in the context of dynamic 
inconsistency with changing preferences, both in the consumption model of Strotz, and in the more 
general case of Hammond’s (1976) potential addict. In that context, the sophisticated chooser has 
been described as an agent who anticipates his future choice, and chooses the best option among 
those that he is ready to follow. In the context of dynamic choice under risk and uncertainty, where 
inconsistency is a problem in case preferences are non-expected utility, sophisticated choice can be 
characterised similarly. As discussed above, McClennen has offered a model of sophisticated 
behaviour in this context by modelling the strategy through dynamic choice conditions. Machina 
has discussed a strategy which represents the equivalent of sophisticated choice in the same 
dynamic context. In what follows I discuss other models of sophisticated behaviour in dynamic 
choice under risk. 
Consider the following dynamic choice decision problem, introduced by Karni and Safra 
(1989b) and discussed by Dardanoni (1990). This example shows how violation of the 
independence axiom on the part of the agent’s preferences generates a problem of dynamically 
inconsistent choice, and allows also to outline the different predictions of the myopic and 
sophisticated choice models. 
 
            Up                  ½                                 Up 
1                          2                              3                              D 
        Down                  ½                             Down 
    
A                         B                           C 
 
Figure 9 – Decision tree showing the potential dynamic inconsistency of violations of the 
Independence Axiom 
 
The agent faces the outcomes A, B, C and D, which can be considered to be lotteries. Suppose 
that his preferences are such that 
D ≻ C but (½ B + ½ C) ≻ (½ B + ½ D), in violation of the independence axiom, which would 
imply that since D ≻ C, then (½ B + ½ D) ≻ (½ B + ½ C). 
In addition, assume also that 
A ≻ (½ B + ½ D) but (½ B + ½ C) ≻ A. 
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At each decision node, the agent has to decide whether to go Up or Down. 
At the beginning of the tree, the agent has three possible courses of action to take: 
• Up at the first node, and Up at the second, which implies lottery (½ B + ½ D) 
• Up at the first node, and Down at the second, which implies lottery (½ B + ½ C) 
• Down at the first node, which implies lottery A. 
At the second decision node, the agent faces two courses of action: going Up, which implies 
lottery D, and going Down, which implies lottery C. 
According to the agent’s preferences, at the beginning of the tree, the best action to take 
would be to go Up at the first decision node, and Down at the second. However, at the second 
decision node, the best action is Up. Therefore, the optimal continuation at the second decision 
node does not coincide with the continuation of the optimal course of action at the initial decision 
node. There is a potential for dynamic inconsistent choice, which is a consequence of the violation 
of independence. 
An agent choosing according to myopic choice, will incur in dynamically inconsistent 
behaviour. He will follow at each decision node the strategy that is most preferred at that node, on 
the basis of the options which result from the continuation of the strategy, ignoring any 
inconsistency which may arise from this behaviour. The myopic agent is described by Machina 
(1989) as a “ β -type” decision maker. In the above example he will choose to go Up at the first 
decision node, and will plan to go Down at the second decision node, following his preferred 
lottery, (½ B + ½ C). At the second choice node, however, he will be left with the options resulting 
from the continuation of the strategy, C and D, and will choose D. The myopic agent will act 
differently from his original plan, and obtain an outcome which is dispreferred. 
An agent choosing according to the equivalent of the sophisticated choice model in dynamic 
choice under certainty, will anticipate his future choice, and choose at each decision node the 
strategy which he will be able to follow, eliminating those plans which he anticipates he would not 
be able to implement. In the example, the agent “folds backwards”; he anticipates that at the second 
decision node he would choose the dispreferred lottery D, and rules out the possibility of making 
such a choice, by going for lottery A at the first decision node. 
Karni and Safra’s model of “behavioural consistency” is a way of implementing the 
sophisticated choice approach (Machina, 1989), and represents a solution to the problem of 
dynamic inconsistency with non-linear preferences, “equivalent (...) to the ‘sophisticated’ approach 
to dynamic consistency in choices under certainty” (Dardanoni, 1990). The decision maker is 
represented by a “collection“ of agents, one at each node of the decision tree, and behaviour is 
modelled so to represent the subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975) of the game among the 
agents representing the decision maker at the different decision nodes. 
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In the above example, Karni and Safra consider “unreasonable“ to suppose that the agent 
would choose the course of action (Up, Down) at the beginning of the tree, being aware of his 
preferences at the second decision node, and suggest as more “plausible“ that he will reject that plan 
as “self-deceiving“. The reasonable choice remains Down at the first decision node. This is 
achieved by backward induction. 
The course of action of going Down at the first decision node is the unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium of the game between two players situated at the first and the second decision nodes. 
The behaviour which represents the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game among the agents at 
the different nodes, is consistent, and the course of action it generates is behaviourally consistent. 
The notion of Nash equilibrium as a solution to the choice of an optimal consumption plan 
when tastes are endogenously changing had been already proposed by Peleg and Yaari (1973). As 
discussed previously in the chapter, references of similar approaches and their applications to the 
problem of inconsistent dynamic choice under risk are found in Machina (1989). He defines the 
dynamically consistent non-expected utility agents, who adopt a backward induction for 
determining the optimal strategy in a dynamic decision problem, as ∂-type decision makers10. 
 
Karni and Safra (1989b) analyse ascending-bid auctions with non-expected utility 
preferences, and replace dynamic consistency with the model of behavioural consistency, 
maintaining consequentialism and reduction of compound lotteries. Behavioural consistency is 
considered also in Karni and Safra (1990) as a necessary assumption when preferences are non-
expected utility to avoid dynamic inconsistent choices. In Karni and Safra (1990) behavioural 
consistency is applied to the analysis of optimal stopping rules. 
 
The model of dynamic choice considered, which will be referred to as sophisticated choice, 
resolves the problem of inconsistency. However, it may give rise to “undesirable“ behaviour. 
Machina (1989) argues that the sophisticated approach may generate different choices in decision 
trees which are strategically equivalent, with a consequent non-indifference between these trees; 
and may exhibit aversion to costless information (pages 1654-5)11. 
Dardanoni (1990) gives an example of how the sophisticated approach can lead to choice of 
‘dominated’ strategies. In the previous example, sophisticated consistent behaviour was leading to 
an outcome dominant with respect to the myopic choice outcome according to the preferences of 
                                                          
10 Machina does not use directly the term sophisticated choice for this kind of approach. 
11 Aversion to information is one of the dynamic arguments against non-expected utility. In Machina (1989) the argument concerns 
an agent who behaves according to sophisticated choice. Karni and Safra have pointed out that in game theory terms, aversion to 
information is a “pre-commitment strategy“ on the side of the fist agent against moves on the part of the later stage agents. Strategic 
use of pre-commitment allows Cubitt, Starmer and Sugden (1998a) to interpret some results they obtain in their experiment as 
sophisticated choice behaviour. 
 
 
64 
the agent at the beginning of the tree. Different results can be obtained in case a perspective of 
Pareto dominance is adopted as a criterion for strategy evaluation. 
Dardanoni (1990) shows that it is possible to construct examples, where Pareto dominance is 
not implied by dominance according to the first agent’s preferences. Furthermore, he gives an 
example of a game where behavioural consistency leads to a Pareto dominated outcome with 
respect to myopic choice. 
These results resemble the ones in Grout (1982), where it is shown that myopic choice can be 
dominant over sophisticated choice in a dynamic choice situation in conditions of certainty with 
changing preferences. 
Dardanoni (1990) may be considered as an extension of Grout’s result to the case of 
unchanging preferences under conditions of risk. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper the main contributions to the discussion of the problem of  inconsistency in a 
dynamic decision problem have been reviewed. 
In a context of choice under certainty the attention has been focused on the initial contribution 
by Hammond (1976, 1977), which contains many elements on which the following literature will 
develop. 
In a context of choice under risk and uncertainty the problem occurs when preference 
orderings violate Expected Utility Theory. Here the case of violation of Expected Utility through 
violation of the Independence Axiom has been considered. The problem is introduced through the 
example by Raiffa (1968), which uses the Allais paradox to show the link between violation of 
independence and dynamic inconsistency. A review of Machina (1989) follows. Particular attention 
has been given to the general example of how any violation of independence generates dynamically 
inconsistent choices, and to the application of this example to the prospects of the Allais paradox. 
This application allows to introduce the specific example of the dynamic inconsistency of non-
expected utility agents with Allais kind of preferences. 
In the context of these decision problems, the different models of choice available to the agent 
have been discussed, with particular attention to Machina’s solution to the problem of inconsistent 
choice and his discussion of consequentialism. 
The different arguments, conditions and strategies of choice have then been summarized and 
related through some simple decision trees. 
McClennen’s (1990) contribution to the debate has then been reviewed. First, the general 
theoretical frame of the dynamic inconsistency problem has been mentioned, as McClennen’s and 
Machina’s arguments are contributions to that debate. Then, the elements of McClennen’s analysis 
have been considered. A description of the rational dynamic choice conditions has been introduced, 
and the models of choice available to the agent - myopic, sophisticated and resolute choice- 
discussed in the context of a dynamic decision problem, when the agent’s preferences violate 
independence. Different models of choice maintain and violate different conditions. Resolute 
Choice maintains dynamic consistency and is McClenenn’s solution to the inconsistency problem. 
To conclude, other contributions have been considered which discuss the model of 
Sophisticated Choice. 
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8. Appendix - Notation and formal definitions of McClennen’s dynamic 
choice conditions and models of choice 
8.1 Some notation and definitions 
1) The evaluation of plans 
The minimal requirement on the coherence of the ranking is made, that for any T for which a finite 
set of plans is defined, there is at least one plan that the agent does not rank below the others. 
Therefore, D(S) is not empty for any S. 
2) The evaluation of plans at subsequent nodes 
• Evaluation of truncated plans 
D(S(ni)) is defined as the set of truncated plans that the agent judges acceptable from the new 
point ni. 
• Evaluation of plan continuations 
From this perspective, the agent will have to consider which of the present plan continuations are 
continuations of members of D(S) defined at any point ni. Then, it is possible to define for any node 
ni, D(S)(ni) as the set of all plans in D(S) that the agent can still implement from ni, so that D(S)(ni) 
is the restriction of D(S) to the continuations from ni onward of plans in D(S). 
• Evaluation of truncated plans as de novo trees 
For any T define T(ni)d as the truncated tree T(ni) conceived as a full tree that starts de novo at 
node ni, and is like T(ni), except for “having no history or collateral paths”. Then, S(ni)d is the set of 
plans available to the agent in T(ni)d and D(S(ni)d) is the set of plans for T(ni)d acceptable to the 
agent. 
The different perspectives from which the agent who finds himself at a certain node ni in a tree T 
can evaluate the plans from that point are the following three. 
• D(S)(ni) concerns the evaluation made by the agent of all the possible plans available to him 
before any move by nature or by the agent himself has taken place. 
• D(S(ni)) concerns the evaluation of the alternatives available to the agent at node ni, from the 
perspective of node ni itself. 
• D(S(ni)d) concerns the evaluation of the agent in the case he is given a ‘de novo’ decision 
problem identical to the one he is considering. 
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Prospects 
For any tree T and plan s in S, gs is defined as the prospect associated with s, and GS the set of 
prospects associated with S. 
For any truncated plan s(ni) at ni, gs(ni) is defined to be the prospect associated with s(ni), and 
GS(ni) the set of prospects associated with S(ni). 
 
8.2 Dynamic choice conditions 
8.2.1 Conditions of reduction 
Simple Reduction (SR). Given T with associated S, such that each s in S requires for its 
implementation a single choice “up front” by the agent, and the set GS of prospects 
associated with those plans, then for any s in S and associated gs in GS, s is in D(S) iff gs is 
in the set of acceptable prospects D(GS). 
Plan Reduction (PR). Given T with associated S, and the set of prospects associated with 
those plans GS, then for any s in S and associated gs in GS, s is in D(S) iff gs is in D(GS). 
By “factoring” PR it is possible to show that PR adds to SR the condition that, insofar as 
evaluation is concerned, no distinction exists between plans in normal and extensive form. Given sn 
the normal form of s and Tn the normal version of T, it is possible to formulate the following 
condition: 
Normal-form/extensive form coincidence (NEC). Let T be any decision tree with associated 
S, and Tn the decision problem resulting by converting each s in S into its normal form, so 
that each s in S is mapped into sn in Sn. Then, for any s in S, s is in D(S) iff sn is in D(Sn). 
SR ensures the coincidence between the set of acceptable plans D(S) and the set D(GS) of 
the corresponding acceptable prospects. NEC ensures the coincidence between the set of 
acceptable plans D(S) associated with a tree and the set of acceptable normal form plans 
D(Sn) associated to the same tree. 
 
8.2.2 Dynamic consistency (DC) 
For any choice point ni in a decision tree T, if D(S)(ni) is non-empty and s(ni) is in 
D(S(ni)), then s(ni) is in D(S)(ni); and if s(ni) is in D(S)(ni), then s(ni) is in D(S(ni)). 
In order to reach the formulation of DC given above, two relations have to be established. 
(1) Inclusion (DC-INC). For any choice point ni in T, if D(S)(ni) is non-empty and s(ni) is 
in D(S(ni)), then there is some plan s* in D(S) such that s(ni) = s*(ni) is the plan 
continuation of s* at ni, and hence such that s(ni) = s*(ni) is in D(S(ni)). 
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Dynamic consistency can be formulated in terms of a relation between what is an 
acceptable choice to make at a node ni from the point of view of the beginning of the tree, and what 
is an acceptable choice to make at ni from the point of view of ni itself, that is, a relation between 
D(S)(ni) and D(S(ni)). First of all, it is necessary to assume that at a node ni at which the set D(S)(ni) 
is non-empty, the intersection between the two sets D(S)(ni) and D(S(ni)) is itself non-empty. If this 
does not hold, then it is possible that the agent will choose inconsistently with the plan adopted, as 
that plan is a member of D(S), and what the agent chooses at ni is supposed to be a member of 
D(S(ni)). Besides, given that this holds, it is possible that there exists at ni a plan continuation r(ni), 
which is an element of D(S(ni)), but that no plan r exists in D(S) such that r(ni) is its continuation. 
Then, by choosing r(ni) at ni, the agent will choose inconsistently with the original plan. The DC-
INC condition avoids this by assuming that there must exist some plan r in D(S) whose continuation 
at node ni is r(ni). 
(2) Exclusion (DC-EXC). For any choice point ni in T, if s(ni) is defined and is not in 
D(S(ni)), then s is not in D(S). 
So far it has been required that, if a plan continuation at point n0  is in the set of acceptable 
plans from the point of view of that node, but in the set of acceptable plans there is not a plan whose 
continuation is in the set of plans acceptable at the node from the point of view of the beginning of 
the tree, then there is a possibility for inconsistent choice. That is, plan s must be included in D(S) if 
there is a possibility for its continuation s(ni) to be chosen. 
The DC-EXC condition requires in addition that a plan s should not be in the set of 
acceptable plans D(S), if there are conditions for which its continuation s(ni) will not be chosen, 
because not in the set D(S(ni)) of plans acceptable at a node in the tree from the point of view of the 
node itself. In case this does not hold, it is possible for the agent to choose inconsistently with his 
original plan. That is, plan s must be excluded from D(S) if there is a possibility for its continuation 
s(ni) not to be chosen. 
The condition DC of dynamic consistency defined above is obtained by combining the 
above conditions of inclusion and exclusion. 
 
8.2.3 Separability (SEP) 
SEP requires the agent to choose in the truncated tree T(ni) in the same way he would 
choose in the separate tree T(ni)d corresponding to T(ni), therefore stating a connection between 
D(S(ni)) and D(S(ni)d). SEP is defined as follows: 
For any tree T and node ni in T, let T(ni)d be a separate tree that begins at node ni and 
coincides with T(ni), and let S(ni)d be the set of plans available in T(ni)d that correspond 
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one to one with the set of truncated plans S(ni) available in T(ni). Then, s(ni) is in D(S(ni)) 
iff s(ni)d is in D(S(ni)d). 
The role of SEP can be better understood by considering the following condition: 
Truncated plan reduction (TR). Let ni be any node in a decision tree T, and S(ni) be the set 
of truncated plans that can be associated with T(ni). Then s(ni) is in D(S(ni)) iff gs(ni) is in 
D(GS(ni)). 
By factoring TR, it is possible to see that TR can be derived by PR by adding the condition 
of separability SEP to it. 
Consider the distinction between the truncated tree T(ni) and the truncated tree T(ni)d, 
identical to T(ni) but conceived as a new tree starting at node ni. The condition PR will apply to 
T(ni)d as this is a whole tree. Then, s(ni)d is in D(S(ni)d) iff gs(ni)d is in D(GS(ni)d). This means that 
s(ni)d is in D(S(ni)d) iff gs(ni) is in D(GS(ni)), as GS(ni)d = GS(ni). So, TR follows if one assumes in 
addition that s(ni) is in D(S(ni)) iff s(ni)d is in D(S(ni)d), which is just SEP. 
 
8.3 Different models of dynamic choice 
8.3.1 Myopic Choice (MC) 
According to MC, the agent selects at each point the strategies or strategy continuations, 
which he judges acceptable from the perspective of that point. 
In the decision tree of Figure 8 the agent who ranks g1 over g2 and g4 over g3, and follows 
all three conditions SR, NEC and SEP, will select plan s at n0 and r(n3) at node n3 and violate DC. 
According to the PR condition, which is equivalent to the conjunction of SR and NEC, 
plan s is in D(S), while plan r is not. As the prospects associated with plans s and r are respectively 
g4 and g3, and the first is preferred to the latter, g4 is in the set of acceptable prospects, while g3 is 
not, and according to PR, its associated plan s is in the set of acceptable plans, while r is not. 
Conditions SR and SEP require that r(n3) is in the set D(S(n3)), while s(n3) is not. 
According to SEP the agent will choose at decision node n3 as if he were facing a new tree starting 
from n3. For SR the plan s in the new tree is associated with prospect g2, while plan r with the 
preferred prospect g1, so that plan r will, while plan s will not, be in the set of acceptable plans, and 
will be chosen. Then, for SEP r(n3) and not s(n3) will be in the set of acceptable plans at n3. 
 
8.3.2 Sophisticated Choice (SC) 
Consider the following definition of sophisticated choice: 
A SC agent regards a plan s as not feasible, and then as not in D(S), if he projects that at 
some point n for which s(ni) is defined, s(ni) is not in D(S(ni)). 
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In terms of the dynamic inconsistency problem, the implication of this definition is that the 
SC agent will avoid violation of DC by restricting the set of feasible plans. 
In order to see how the rational dynamic choice conditions can offer a model of SC 
consider the following refinement of the reduction conditions and their relation with SC. 
Sophisticated choice and reduction - weakening of the PR condition 
Recall the condition of plan reduction PR which has been defined above. In the following, 
PR is going to be weakened. The restricted version of plan reduction which will be considered, 
corresponds to the following restricted conception of feasibility: 
Separable feasibility (SF). A plan is feasible iff s(ni)d is in D(S(ni)d) for every choice point 
ni, ni ≠0, for which s is defined. 
Restricted plan reduction (RPR). For any plan s, such that s satisfies SF, s is in D(S) iff gs 
is in D(GS). 
RPR requires that the mapping of acceptable plans in the decision tree T into acceptable 
plans in its normal form Tn, does not apply to all possible plans in T, but only to the separably 
feasible plans. That is, in its restricted version, PR holds only with respect to the evaluation of the 
plans which are feasible according to SF. But then, what characterises the change in a commitment 
to PR here is a rejection of NEC as applicable to all possible plans at n0, that is, the emergence of a 
disparity between the evaluation of plans at the moment of decision, and the evaluation of plans in a 
once-and-for-all choice, so that whether plans are in extensive or normal form makes a difference. 
Given SF, NEC can be understood to apply only to sets of plans that are separably feasible, not to 
all plans at n0. 
Therefore, an SC agent makes choice as required by SR, SEP and DC; but when he faces a 
potential violation of DC, he commits to PR only in its restricted modified form of RPR. This 
modification of PR is characterised by a rejection of NEC as applicable to all possible plans 
available to the agent at n0. The SC agent accepts the conditions SR, SEP and RPR. 
 
8.3.3 Resolute Choice (RC) 
In formal terms, dynamic consistency only requires that the (non-empty) restriction of  
D(S) to ni, that is, D(S)(ni), coincides with D(S(ni)). 
SC requires that D(S)(ni) has to be constrained to D(S(ni)) for any ni at which D(S)(ni) is 
non-empty, and that D(S(ni)) has to be constrained to D(S(ni)d. That is, what the agent expects to 
choose is conditioned by SR, SEP, and his preferences with respect to the prospects associated at 
each new tree corresponding to each node ni. 
RC requires to apply PR to n0 in order to determine D(S), and then to constrain D(S(ni)) to 
D(S)(ni) for any ni for which D(S)(ni) is non-empty. 
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